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ABSTRACT
This article examines the link between women's rights and the "War on
Terror," and advocates a change in the United States' policy to incorporate
women's rights into a national security strategy to confront militant Islamic
fundamentalism. Specifically, the U.S. should ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and take advantage of the Treaty's status as the authori-
tative international statement on women's rights to direct such efforts to-
wards the Arab and Muslim world.
The United States' promotion of CEDAW can reinitiate a debate on
women's rights in Muslim societies, shift the political balance of power to-
wards progressive forces, and weaken the appeal of the fundamentalist ide-
ology, which opposes such ideas from within. The Treaty would shield the
U.S. from the political costs of activism, and would represent an important
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step in winning the hearts and minds of Muslims, which is essential to
changing the current political dynamic that allows fundamentalism to flour-
ish.
I. INTRODUCTION
The "War on Terror"1 represents a distinct stage in a long-running con-
flict between militant Islamic fundamentalism and the West.3 The existence
of this conflict is plainly evident in the rhetoric of prominent militant Islamic
fundamentalists during the second half of the twentieth century, as well as
the escalation of acts of violence by such groups against Western and U.S.
targets since the 1970s, punctuated by the September 11, 2001 attacks in
New York and Washington D.C. From the U.S. perspective, the "War on
Terror" is a reaction to the September 11' attacks and a recognition in part
that militant Islamic fundamentalist groups have become a significant threat
to U.S. national security."
1. The phrase "War on Terror" was popularized in the U.S., in part by the Bush Admini-
stration and in part by the U.S. media, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and has
become common usage. Though the phrase may be popular, it is in certain respects overly
broad and a misnomer. "Terror" is not an enemy per se, but a method of violence that is often
used for political purposes. Political leaders often conflate their concern with, and see little
distinction between, the methods of terror with the political agenda of terrorist groups. That
the methods of modem terror pose certain risks to the basic functioning of civil societies and
should therefore be condemned regardless of the perpetrator is a valid argument. However, it
is not the terrorist acts of Hamas, the IRA, or Chechen Rebels that have mobilized the U.S.
and its allies to expend resources on a new global campaign, but the attacks of AI-Qaeda, the
militant Islamic fundamentalist group that declared war on the United States in the 1990s and
has escalated the conflict between militant Islamic fundamentalism and the West. Had there
been no September 11', there would not have been a mass mobilization of U.S. resources to
combat "terror." Therefore, the more accurate understanding of the "War on Terror," in my
view, is a response to a threat posed by militant Islamic fundamentalist groups, rather than the
method of violence used itself.
2. The term "militant Islamic fundamentalism" is used to clearly distinguish this ideol-
ogy from the religion of Islam. Militant Islamic fundamentalism is a political movement that
has adapted a particularly strict interpretation of Islam, which is often at odds with main-
stream schools of Islamic law, to serve a political agenda that seeks to reorganize Islamic so-
cieties and relationships with foreign (i.e., western) powers in accordance with its tenets.
3. All references to "West" or "Western" are to the commonly understood model of po-
litical, social, economic and cultural organization associated with the U.S. and Western
Europe: capitalist economies, social liberty, political freedom, and some measure of inde-
pendence of society from state and religion. From the perspective of militant Islamic funda-
mentalists, Arabs and Muslims, the West typically means Western Europe and North Amer-
ica.
4. The Second Gulf War of 2003 and subsequent occupation of Iraq by a U.S. led coali-
tion, which removed the regime of Saddam Hussein from power ("Iraq War of 2003"), is of-
ten characterized by supporters as part of the "War on Terror." Although the Iraq War of 2003
is not the subject of this article, it represents a pivotal event in U.S.-Middle East relations and
deserves comment. In the author's opinion, the Iraq War of 2003 is not part of the "War on
Terror," as Iraq was not connected in any demonstrable or significant way with Al-Qaeda or
more specifically with the attacks of September 11, 2001. Arguments made by the Bush Ad-
ministration and its supporters alleging such connections have failed to establish any conclu-
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However, what is somewhat overlooked is that within Islamic societies
there has been an equally contentious political and cultural struggle over
several decades between militant Islamic fundamentalists and modernizers, a
key aspect of which centers on the rights and liberties of women. Wherever
fundamentalists have taken power in the Arab and Muslim world, they have
almost invariably moved to sharply restrict the rights of women relative to
secular or mixed legal systems.' In describing the program of militant Is-
lamic fundamentalist movements throughout the Muslim world in the twen-
tieth century, Professor Bernard Lewis succinctly states, "[tihe emancipation
of women is one of the main grievances of the fundamentalists and its rever-
sal is in the forefront of their programme.""
Militant Islamic fundamentalists view both the international struggle
against western power and the cultural struggle within Islamic societies as
equally important to their cause. Both are products of the same source,
namely, western, and in particular U.S., power and values. Overcoming the
threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism cannot be reduced simply to
breaking up prominent terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda. The history of mili-
tant Islamic fundamentalist movements suggests that other variants will ap-
pear regardless of a particular leader or organization, and will continue,
unless challenged and discredited, to be a potent political force within the
Islamic world. Moreover, because of their intense ideological commitment,
fundamentalist groups will continue to confront Western and U.S. interests.
The scale and audacity of the September 11" attacks will be the barometer
by which future militant Islamic fundamentalist activity is measured. There-
fore, one can, and should, expect an intensified conflict that extends from the
capitals of Arab states to the U.S. itself.
This article argues that a decisive victory in the "War on Terror" must
include winning the hearts and minds of Muslims to affirmatively reject the
world-view and prescriptions of militant Islamic fundamentalism. This will
require the West to address the internal debate within Islamic societies be-
tween fundamentalists and modernizers, which will necessarily focus in part
on the rights and liberties of women. Just as the U.S. often promoted human
rights and individual liberty as part of its challenge to the Communist world-
sive evidence, and in many cases proffered theories have been affirmatively disproved. Sad-
dam Hussein's Iraq can best be characterized as a brutal secular fascist dictatorship. Hussein
spent most of his political career-opposing fundamentalists, often violently suppressing them
(especially Shiites), because fundamentalists desired to replace his regime and others
throughout the Arab world. During the 1980's Saddam Hussein's Iraq was seen as an ally by
the West (including the U.S.) to confront and curb the revolutionary aims of fundamentalist
Iran. Though the Hussein regime ran afoul of the U.S. following its invasion of Kuwait in
1990, prompting the first Gulf War of 1991 and a decade of U.N. sanctions, weapons inspec-
tions, isolation and containment, connections to Al-Qaeda or other fundamentalist groups
were not part of the many grievances against that regime.
5. See BERNARD LEwis, THE MIDDLE EAST, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS
383 (1995).
6. Id.
2004]
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view during the Cold War,7 so too should the West advance women's rights
as part of its strategy to challenge militant Islamic fundamentalism.
To do so, the U.S. should seek international consensus and use the tools
available under international law to promote women's rights in countries that
have a strong fundamentalist presence. In no way could the U.S. demonstrate
its commitment to women's rights more clearly than by ratifying the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) (also known as the Women's Rights Conven-
tion).' CEDAW represents the most comprehensive statement regarding the
political, economic, social and cultural rights of women, and thus, presents a
direct challenge to some of the most ardently held views of militant Islamic
fundamentalism. Moreover, with an impressive number of signatories, in-
cluding many from the Arab and Muslim world,9 CEDAW provides an es-
tablished framework of consensus through which the U.S. can exert influ-
ence in this region.
If the U.S. were to assert itself as a leading proponent of CEDAW, it
would have a broad platform to challenge militant Islamic fundamentalists
while promoting a social vision that Muslims could adapt to their own socie-
ties. The U.S. could tilt the political balance of power within Islamic coun-
tries towards reform by encouraging governments to comply with
CEDAW's provisions and reporting process. With the active support and
leadership of the U.S. government in setting priority areas of concern regard-
ing women's rights, moderates in Islamic societies would be empowered and
emboldened to challenge, critique and weaken Islamic fundamentalist
movements from within. Furthermore, CEDAW's broad acceptance by the
international community would partially insulate the U.S. from the political
risks of such activism, while providing a useful vehicle to seek changes in
the political dynamics of Arab and Muslim societies that have lent support to
militant Islamic fundamentalism.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of militant Islamic funda-
mentalist movements during the twentieth century and examines their impact
7. See generally DAvID RYAN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD HISTORY 1-18, 83-93,
116-62 (2000).
8. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ daw/cedaw/ce-
daw.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinafter "CEDAW," the "Treaty" or the
"Convention"]. CEDAW entered into force on September 3, 1981 in accordance with Article
27, paragraph 1, which states: "The present convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth
day after the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth
instrument of ratification or accession." Id. art. 27 para. 1.
9. For the most up to date list of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty, See State Par-
ties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2003)
[hereinafter CEDAW Ratifications]. There are currently twenty-five Arab and Muslim coun-
tries that are State Parties to CEDAW including the following: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria,
Bahrain, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lybia, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Tur-
key, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Id.
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on the rights of women. Part IH analyzes the provisions of CEDAW and the
Treaty's effect on women's rights around the world. In addition, Part Ill ana-
lyzes criticisms of CEDAW and the status of ratification in the United
States. Part IV describes the historic importance of human rights to U.S. for-
eign policy, and how women's rights intersect with the "War on Terror."
This section concludes with general recommendations on how the U.S.
should incorporate CEDAW into its foreign policy in the context of the
"War on Terror."
II. MILITANT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply because
we are a weak nation and have no dollars? America is worse than Britain,
Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of
them. They are all worse and more unclean than each other. But today it is
America that we are concerned with. (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Oct.
24, 1963).0
If the religious leaders have influence, they will not permit people's inno-
cent daughters to be under young men at school; they will not permit
women to teach at boys' schools and men to teach at girls' schools, with
all the resulting corruption. (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Oct. 24,
1963)."
Hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded
for it by God.... I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the leg-
end of the so-called superpower that is America. (Osama Bin Laden, Dec.
23, 1998.)12
10. BAQER MoIN, KHOMEINI: LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH 125 (2000); ISLAM AND
REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI 185 (Hamid Algar trans.,
1981). The quote is from a speech made by Ayatollah Khomeini in his hometown of Qom,
Iran denouncing certain immunities granted under Iranian law to U.S. troops operating in Iran,
and more generally, the secular reforms known as the "White Revolution" enacted by Iran's
pro-western leader and dictator, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Id. at 122-27. This fiery
speech, among others, eventually led the Shah to forcibly exile Khomeini from Iran. See id. at
127-28. Khomeini eventually settled in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq where he spent the
better part of the next twelve years fashioning his vision of an Islamic Republic and organiz-
ing resistance to the Shah's regime. Khomeini was later exiled from Iraq and settled in Neau-
phle-le-Chateau, near Paris, France in 1978, where he drew the attention of the world media
and became recognized worldwide as the spiritual and political leader of the 1978-79 Iranian
revolution.
11. ISLAM AND REVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 183.
12. Osama Bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements, PBS FRONTLINE, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/biniaden/who/edicts.htnl (last visited Aug.
27, 2003). This quote is from an interview that Osama Bin Laden gave to Time Magazine.
The interview was excerpted on the PBS Frontline web site.
2004]
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A. Tenets of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism
These statements by Ayatollah Khomeini and Osama Bin Laden, two
leaders of modem militant Islamic fundamentalist movements, each from
distinct religious sects, ethnicities, socio-economic backgrounds and genera-
tions, provide useful insight into the world-view shared by the movement's
followers. Adherents and sympathizers often highlight a cultural and strate-
gic threat posed by the West to Islamic societies. 3 The cultural threat to Is-
lam is exemplified by the relative openness and permissiveness of western
cultures, whose "poisonous" values are transmitted to Muslim youth by way
of mass media and are subversive of Muslim culture, representing a direct
threat to Islam itself.4 Moreover, fundamentalists often point to the rights
and liberties accorded to women in western societies as among the most tan-
gible examples of the corrosive influence of western values. 5
The fundamentalist prescription: a complete reorganization of Islamic
societies in accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an6 as interpreted by
fundamentalist clerics, who generally envision a return to an idyllic Islamic
community of the seventh century when the Prophet Mohammed founded
the religion. 7 In practice, as exemplified by Iran under Khomeini 8 and Af-
ghanistan under the Taliban, 9 this reorganization has meant the strict
imposition and enforcement of fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic law,
the elimination of equal rights accorded to women and non-Muslim
minorities by prior governments, strict censorship of mass media and
entertainment media, mandatory religious training, and constant monitoring
of social conduct by religious police organizations.'0 The fundamentalist
13. See, e.g., FEREYDOUN HOVEYDA, THE BROKEN CRESCENT: THE "THREAT" OF
MILITANT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 134-36 (1998).
14. Id. at 64, 135.
15. See LEwis, supra note 5, at 382-83; Nayereh Tohidi, Modernity, Islamization and
Women in Iran, in GENDER AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: WOMEN AND POLITICS IN MUSLIM
SOcIETIES, 110, 124-26 (Valentine M. Moghadam ed. 1994) (describing how fundamentalist
religious clerics identified the westernized or "'westoxicated' woman" as contributing to the
moral decline of pre-revolutionary Iranian society).
16. The Qur'an is a compilation of the Prophet Mohammed's sermons- "revelations in
Arabic that purportedly came to him from the archangel Gabriel." DILIP HmO, IRAN UNDER
THE AYATOLLAHS 9-10 (1985).
17. Id.
18. For a detailed discussion of the policies implemented by the Ayatollah Khomeni's
Islamic government in Iran, see generally SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS:
IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 55-69, 71-91, 166-94 (1990); Hmo, supra note 16, at
250-63.
19. For a detailed discussion of the policies implemented by the Taliban in Afghanistan,
see generally ROSEMARIE SKAINE, THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE TALIBAN 61-86,
156-60 (2002); Nancy Gallagher, The International Campaign Against Gender Apartheid in
Afghanistan, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 367, 372-79 (2000-01); U.S. State. De-
partment, Afghanistan-Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/200I/sa/8222pf.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Afghanistan Report 2001].
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duct by religious police organizations The fundamentalist program also
calls for the systematic withdrawal of Islamic Republics from the western
economic system, with an emphasis on nationalization of industry and self-
sufficiency.' Further, militant Islamic fundamentalists completely reject
western social, economic and political values, reject the possibility of coop-
eration with western countries, and demand the imposition of a quasi-
totalitarian Islamic state run by religious clerics."
The strategic threat posed by the West to the Islamic world, according to
militant Islamic fundamentalists, is demonstrated by 1) European colonial-
ism of Muslim lands during the inter-war period; 2) U.S. support for "cor-
rupt" Arab dictatorships (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
U.A.E., Bahrain); 3) the presence of U.S. troops on Arab and Muslim soil
(e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E, Yemen, and Iraq);
and 4) the enduring U.S. policy of support for the State of Israel since the
latter's establishment in 1948.23 Each is viewed by militant Islamic funda-
mentalists as an example of how western political power has been used to
subjugate and frustrate a true Muslim power, Caliphate, 4 or Islamic super-
state, from arising to challenge western dominance.3 The fundamentalists'
objective is a continual confrontation against U.S., Israeli and western inter-
ests worldwide, the purpose of which is to destroy western civilization, re-
establish a Caliphate, and impose fundamentalist Islam upon the world. 6
Another key aspect of militant Islamic fundamentalism is its Pan-
Islamic focus. Borrowing a theme from many anti-colonial nationalist
movements, fundamentalists exhort all Muslims to see themselves as one
community (umma)27 in relation to the "infidel" enemy, the West. Further-
more, fundamentalist groups believe they should assist each other in estab-
lishing Islamic Republics throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
Khomeini, an Iranian Shiite Muslim, and Bin Laden, a Saudi Sunni
Muslim, 2 '9 have each emphasized such support for like-minded militant fun-
20. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 64-65.
21. See id. at 64-68.
22. For an extensive discussion of militant Islamic fundamentalism, see generally
HOVEYDA, supra note 13; AMAL SAAD-GHORAYEB, HIZBU'LLAH: POLITICs & RELIGION
(2002).
23. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 133-36.
24. LEwIS, supra note 5, at 54-55. Caliphate is the name given to the early Muslim em-
pires that succeeded the Prophet Mohammed after his death in 632, and expanded Islam from
the Arabian Peninsula to the Fertile Crescent, Palestine, North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula,
and Southwest Asia. Id.
25. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 134-35.
26. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 126-28, 133-36, 157-58, 162-63.
27. Id. at 20, 152 ("umma" is the "community of believers," as Muslims call the state
headed and created by the Prophet).
28. See id. at 119, 163.
29. The Shi'a and Sunni are distinct sects within Islam. About 85% of Muslims belong
to the Sunni sect and 15% are Shi'a. Huda, What's the Difference Between Shia and Sunni
Muslims?, at http://islam.about.comcs/divisions/f/shiasunni.htm, (last visited Apr. 25,
2004]
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damentalist groups, largely without regard to ethnic background or Islamic
religious sect. This sense of urgency for unity is additionally underscored in
the fundamentalists' concomitant call for a holy war or "jihad" against the
West.3"
B. Militant Islamic Fundamentalism in the Twentieth Century
Modem militant Islamic fundamentalism arose as a somewhat delayed
reaction to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire3 at the end of World War I
and the subsequent partition of large parts of the Arab world between the
United Kingdom and France.32 Many Muslim conservatives and nationalists
decried foreign rule and the division of the former Islamic Caliphate into ar-
tificial nation-states, as well as the shame of Arabs (having been conquered
by the West), the growing impact of western culture and values on Islamic
societies, and the increasing Jewish presence in Palestine under Ottoman and
British rule.33 Although they were a relatively fringe presence during the
years between World War I and II, militant Islamic fundamentalists were in-
volved in movements with nationalists and communists to rid the Middle
East of western power and influence during the inter-war period. Many in-
volved in such movements, fundamentalist and otherwise, allied themselves
2004). The differences between the two sects have evolved over many years in historical lore,
religious practice and custom, but are primarily rooted in a political dispute over the issue of
succession. See id. Specifically, Sunnis and Shiites disagree over how successors to the
Prophet Mohammad (Caliphs) should be chosen to head the Islamic nation (the Caliphate).
Sunnis believe that the Caliph should be selected by a group of contemporary Islamic reli-
gious and political leaders. Id. Shiites believe that only direct descendants of the Prophet
Mohammad should be eligible to serve as and/or appoint the Caliph. Id. The Shiite view is
based on the experience of the fourth Caliph to succeed the Prophet Mohammed, Ali, who
was the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law and headed a political movement through which he
ascended to the position. See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 63-67. After a five-year reign, Ali was
killed in 661 A.D. by political rivals in the city of Najaf (present day Iraq). Id. A power strug-
gle ensued in the years following Ali's death in which other rivals wrested control of the Ca-
liphate from Ali's political supporters and established a dynasty known as the Umayyad Ca-
liphate. Many of Ali's supporters, including Ali's son, Husayn, were defeated and killed at a
battle in Karbala (present day Iraq). Id. These two events at Najaf and Karbala had a profound
and searing impact on Islam, as Ali's political movement transformed itself into a distinct re-
ligious sect. Id. The two holiest shrines in the Shi'a faith are located in Najaf and Karbala, and
were erected to commemorate the suffering of Ali and Husayn, respectively, and what Shiites
view as the tragic usurpation of power from the rightful rulers of the Islamic Caliphate. Id.
30. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 153-58 (describing the fundamentalist conception of
Jihad as distinguished from the mainstream Islamic understanding of the term).
31. The Ottoman Empire was the last Muslim empire. See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 342,
354.
32. Id. at 343 (Britain and France divided the Fertile Crescent into colonies and depend-
encies which came under their rule).
33. See generally HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 133-36; LEWIS, supra note 5, at 342-68,
371-84.
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with Germany during World War II in the hope that British and French co-
lonial power could be overthrown and a Caliphate restored."
Following World War II, fundamentalists allied themselves with nation-
alists to oppose foreign interference and support the establishment of inde-
pendent Muslim nation-states," but quickly parted ways on the issue of
modernization, which involved reform programs favorable to women's
rights and the introduction of western models of industrialization, education
and social organization." Many nationalist governments cracked down, ar-
rested and purged fundamentalists throughout the Arab and Muslim world,
from Algeria to Egypt to Iran.3" However, over time, these purges served to
elevate the standing of fundamentalists among Muslims who became disaf-
fected with repressive regimes, a lack of social and economic progress, the
humiliation of Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War, and the impact of western culture on their societies and values.38
Although fundamentalist groups had made an impact on Middle East
politics from the end of World War II through the 1970s, the first watershed
moment for militant Islamic fundamentalism was the triumph of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the imposition by Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini of an Islamic Republic according to his Shiite fundamentalist pro-
gram.39 Khomeini's revolution galvanized many like-minded people (Shiite
as well as Sunni) throughout the Muslim world and gave inspiration to simi-
lar movements in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, Southwest Asia and
Southeast Asia.' Many Arab regimes viewed Khomeni's Iran as a regional
threat because of the regime's openly stated ambition to export its revolution
throughout the Muslim world.4
34. See LEwis, supra note 5, at 348-50.
35. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 9-13, 23-26 ("religious activists and secular nation-
alists worked hand in hand against the collaborationists and the foreigners," and
"[flundamentalists themselves often worked in nationalist groups").
36. See id. at 117-18 (Muslim countries introduced capitalist and socialist development
ideas, while fundamentalists called for a return to traditional ways of living).
37. See id. at 46.
38. Id. at 133-36.
39. See id. at 88-89, 189 (noting the "turning point" in militant Islamic fundamentalism
was triggered by Khomeini's seizure of power in Iran).
40. See id. at 89, 109 ("Iranian revolution has... become a model for all the "power
seekers" of Muslim countries.").
41. Id. at 109. The Iranian revolution was one of the largest mass revolts in recent his-
tory. The Pahlavi regime had come under great pressure at home from Iranians disappointed
with the progress of economic growth, heightened inflation, increasing inequality leading to
class conflict, Hmo, supra note 16, at 62-63, and the heavy-handed tactics of the Shah's se-
cret police force, the Savak. Id. at 41 (Savak was the Shah's "Organisation of National Secu-
rity and Intelligence). In addition, the Shah's regime had been criticized by the U.S. for its
poor human rights record and lack of democratic reforms. See id. at 63-65. This public criti-
cism from a country that many saw as the Pahlavi regime's principal benefactor led opponents
(Khomeini included) to believe that the U.S. did not strongly support the Shah and would not
intervene to protect his regime in the event of a sustained uprising. From mid-1977 through
1978, public demonstrations and strikes became commonplace and the police and the Savak
20041
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The second important event in the rise of militant Islamic fundamental-
ism was the end of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in 1989,
and the victory claimed by those that opposed the Soviet army, which in-
cluded a disparate group of "Mujaheddin" fighters42 who were more or less
conservative and anti-modernist, if not fundamentalist in nature. The messy
aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war saw the emergence of the Pakistani sup-
ported Taliban in the mid-1990s, which imposed one of the most draconian
fundamentalist regimes in recent memory and essentially turned back the
clock on Afghanistan's previous modernization efforts during the middle
part of the twentieth century."3
The third important event in the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism
was the emergence of Al-Qaeda as the major player among a large number
of loosely affiliated but ideologically linked groups of militant fundamental-
ist organizations, sympathizers, business associates and terrorist cells during
the 1980s and 1990s. Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda," interna-
tionalized the conflict between militant Islamic fundamentalism and the
responded with force, killing and wounding scores of Iranians. See generally id. at 66-94 (de-
tailing events leading up to the "end of monarchy"). Rather than silence the demonstrators,
the Shah's crackdown served to swell their ranks, to the point where units of the Army began
to mutiny and join the mass revolt. Id at 85. Despite belated attempts at political reform, the
Shah, in ill-health, concluded in January, 1979 that he could no longer rule Iran and left the
country in control of an appointed Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar. See id. at 86-88. The
new government lacked any political legitimacy, and Khomeini, who had become the spiritual
and figurative leader of the mass revolution, returned to Iran on February 1, 1979. Id. at 90.
Khomeini effectively took over the country following a national referendum in April, 1979 in
which the Iranian public gave an overwhelming victory to the creation of an Islamic Republic.
See id. at 108. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, drafted in December, 1979, vested
supreme authority to control the government in Khomeini and the religious clerical establish-
ment. In November, 1979, Khomeini directly challenged the United States by lending support
to fundamentalist students who seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held U.S. hostages for
444 days. See generally id. at 136-63 for a discussion of the hostage situation. The event
served to sour U.S.-Iranian relations for the next two decades. In addition to confronting the
U.S., Khomeini consolidated his power base and further extended theocratic rule by using
groups outside the government, including the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) to root out rela-
tively more moderate elements within Iran and undermine the elected government of Abol-
hassan Bani-Sadr. For a general timeline of events during and since the Iranian Revolution
and their impact on the rights of women, see Elham Gheytanchi, Appendix: Chronology of
Events Regarding Women in Iran Since the Revolution of 1979, 67 Soc. REs. 439 (2000),
available at http://www.findarticles.comlcfdls/m2267/2 67/63787338/pl/article.jhtmi (last
visited Aug. 28, 2003).
42. The Global Reach of AI-Qaeda: Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Op-
erations and Terrorism of the Comm. On Foreign Relations United States Senate, 107b Cong.,
1' Sess., at 4 (2001) [hereinafter The Global Reach of AI-Qaeda] (prepared statement of J.T.
Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107senate
hearings&docid=f:77601.wais (last visited May 30, 2003).
43. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 182 (describing the Taliban as "superfundamental-
ist").
44. See, e.g., The Global Reach of AI-Qaeda, supra note 42, at 4 (prepared statement of
J.T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation).
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West to a much larger degree than any of his predecessors, sponsoring at-
tacks against U.S. interests in several countries, including the U.S. itself, and
training and supplying Al-Qaeda fighters to several global hotspots (e.g.,
Chechnya, Kashmir). ' It is against this backdrop, and in light of the Sep-
tember 11"' attacks, that the U.S. government has redefined terrorism spon-
sored by militant Islamic fundamentalist groups and their supporters from a
regional problem limited to the Middle East and North Africa, to a threat to
global peace and security."
C. Militant Islamic Fundamentalism and the Rights of Women
Militant Islamic fundamentalist movements have demonstrated a capac-
ity and commitment to erode, check and reverse political reforms designed
to emancipate women that have been attempted or enacted by many Muslim
countries since the colonial era. Fundamentalists have skillfully appealed to
the socially conservative sensibilities of many Muslims, and have exploited
regional conflicts like the Arab-Israeli wars, the dominance of western
power, and domestic political and economic instability to raise their own po-
litical profile, and in some notable cases, gain power. In each Muslim coun-
try where Islamic fundamentalists have achieved some measure of political
power or influence, they have acted decisively to redefine the civil legal
structure according to their vision, and have often targeted the rights of
women to underscore their objectives.'7
One of the most effective arguments made by fundamentalists in ad-
vancing their agenda has been that all Muslims should be governed exclu-
sively by the Islamic civil code (the Shar'ia or "path to follow") and not for-
eign imported norms, because Islamic law better reflects the values and
traditions of Muslims.48 Consequently, they argue, the Shar'ia should be
given priority over and supercede all other secularly enacted civil and crimi-
nal laws.49 Shar'ia is not a fixed, uniform or centralized body of law, but has
many sources and is subject to interpretation, which varies in important ways
from community to community." Fundamentalists have taken full advantage
45. See id. at 5.
46. See generally The Global Reach of Al-Qaeda, supra note 42.
47. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 186-87; Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of
Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under
the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 279, 311-16 (1997).
48. See generally AHMAD S. MOUSSALI, MODERATE AND RADICAL ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY, LEGITIMACY AND THE ISLAMIC STATES 133-
54, 140-43 (1999) (describing the writings of Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential modern
fundamentalist thinkers. Qutb argued that a rigid interpretation of the Shar'ia should exclu-
sively govern all Muslims, and that no other man-made law, western or otherwise, could con-
tradict or oppose the holy laws.). See also Howland, supra note 47, at 315-16.
49. See generally MOUSSALI, supra note 48.
50. There are four principle sources of Islamic Law. E.g., Bharathi Anandhi Venkatra-
man, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM.
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of the decentralized nature of Islam to develop doctrines regarding the role
of women in society, which they have incorporated into their conception of
Islamic law.
According to fundamentalists, female sexuality must be carefully con-
trolled, as its free expression leads to corruption, immorality and the break-
down of social values." They believe women are inherently unstable and are
unable to control their sexual behavior absent strictly enforced moral codes;
women are, therefore, inferior to men and must be controlled by men for the
sake of societal stability." The primary, and virtually only, role for a woman
in a fundamentalist society is to be an obedient and dutiful housewife. 3 A
man must control the family and women must be entirely submissive to men
in all matters.' Moreover, economic independence, education and work out-
side of the home are discouraged." As a result, fundamentalists generally fa-
vor gender segregation in order to carefully restrict the behavior of women
and reinforce the dominant role of men. Furthermore, the laws that govern
Muslim women in fundamentalist societies mandate a strict dress code (the
hijaab), and place restrictions on personal choice in virtually all aspects of
life,57 while men are afforded special rights such as the unilateral right of di-
vorce and the right to enter into polygamous marriages.5" Disobedience of
U.L. REv. 1949, 1965 (1995). The Qur'an is the primary source of Islamic Law. Id. The sec-
ond source is the Sunnah, the recorded and codified statements of the Prophet Mohammed. Id.
at 1967. The third source is Al-Ijma, which are the consensus opinions of the Muslim clergy
(the Ullamah) and powerful members of various Muslim communities. See id. at 1969. The
fourth source is Al-Qiyas, id., which is direct analogy or analogical deduction; it is an exten-
sion of the notion of applying Islamic principles to the modem era relying upon the Qur'an,
Sunnah and Ijma as primary sources. See Hamid M. Khan, Note, Nothing is Written: Funda-
mentalism, Revivalism, Reformism, and the Fate of Islamic Law, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 273,
291; Mohamed H. Al-Hoshan & Maren Hanson, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia, 11 CAL. INT'L
PRACTFITIONER 33-38 (2002). As a strictly legal matter, the concept of interpretation has been
a controversial subject in Islamic law. Many Islamic scholars (mostly from the Sunni sect)
argue that there was a finite period of interpretation, known as Ijtihad, which existed for ap-
proximately 250 years following the Prophet Mohammed's death (until A.D. 900) and closed.
See, e.g., LEwis, supra note 5, at 226. A consensus of Sunni jurists held that all issues of Is-
lamic law had been sufficiently addressed and that further legal interpretation was not permit-
ted. Id. Nonetheless, the process of interpretation has continued in some de facto form as so-
cietal changes over many centuries have raised new problems or issues that require the
attention of Islamic legal jurisprudence. See Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of
the Provisions of the Women's Convention in the Law as Stipulated in Shari'ah, 2 BuFF. J.
INT'L L. 1,6(1995).
51. Howland, supra note 47, at 307-08.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 308.
54. Id. at 308-09.
55. Id. at 309-10.
56. Id. at 308-10.
57. Id. at 312-16.
58. Id. at 314.
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Shar'ia mandates in fundamentalist societies is often punished harshly, in-
cluding by the use of violence."
As a result of the fundamentalist's interpretation of women's role, Is-
lamic law is often perceived as more conservative or restrictive than western
laws with respect to the rights of women. However, a closer examination of
legal systems throughout the Muslim world indicates that this is not neces-
sarily accurate. For example, the legal structure in many Islamic countries
reflects a patchwork of western-inspired norms and competing interpreta-
tions of the Shar'ia by mainstream and fundamentalist schools of Islamic
law.' And although Shar'ia recognizes certain distinctions between men and
women that do not always dovetail neatly with western conceptions of gen-
der equality, many mainstream Islamic scholars would also cast doubt on the
notion that the primary sources of Islamic law support many positions which
the fundamentalists assert as divinely inspired."t This leads to the conclusion
that the scope and meaning of the Shar'ia is often a political question, not a
strictly legal or religious one. However, fundamentalists, because of their
generally strong organizational power within the religious establishment in
many Islamic societies, have largely controlled the political debate as to how
to define the meaning, scope and application of Shar'ia since the end of the
colonial era.62 Put simply, those who control the Mosques define the Shar'ia
and thereby exert control over the daily lives of many Muslims. And almost
invariably, militant Islamic fundamentalists across the Arab and Muslim
world have interpreted the Shar'ia to sharply restrict the rights of women.
59. Id. at 315. Women who failed to adequately comply with the hijaab requirement in
Sudan could be "subject to amputation of hands and feet, hanging, stoning to death or hanging
followed by crucifixion of the body." Id. In Iran, violation of the hijaab requirement could
subject a woman to a punishment of seventy-four lashes. Id.
60. See Venkatraman, supra note 50, at 1976-2000 (analyzing the application of Shar'ia
in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan, as well as the different viewpoints of various long-
standing schools of Islamic Law, including the Maliki, Shafi'I, Hanafi and Hanbali schools).
61. See Khaliq, supra note 50, at 18-44 (discussing several positions claimed by funda-
mentalists as rooted in Qurranic principles, and concluding that the claims are questionable
when analyzed against the primary sources of Islamic law).
62. See Howland, supra note 47, at 311-12. The success of fundamentalists in defining
the role of religion in politics is perhaps best exemplified by Khomeini. Khomeini's call for
the clergy to directly run the government was a significant departure from the traditional Shi-
ite view that religious clerics should only serve as monitors or judges to ensure that a ruler's
decisions were consistent with religious law. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 75. The tradi-
tional view is based in the theology of Shiism, which holds that the Prophet Mohammed en-
trusted his son-in-law Ali, the fourth Caliph (ruler), and his direct descendants, the Imams
(guides), to interpret and reveal the hidden meanings of the Qur'an (the literal word of God).
Shiite theology further states that the twelfth Imam went into hiding and will appear as a mes-
siah (madhi) to restore and impose Islam on the world before its end. See id. Until the twelfth
Imam returns, rulers serve as necessary caretakers, but do not have formal legitimate status.
See id. The clergy's role is even more limited politically, as only the twelfth Imam is the true
legitimate supreme religious leader in Shi'ia Islam.
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1. Women and the Islamic Revolution in Iran
Ayatollah Khomeini made the modernization of women in Iran a key
element of his critique of the Shah's63 regime during the 1978-79 Islamic
revolution.' He had long established his opposition to the secular reforms of
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, known as the "White Revolution"' that par-
tially liberated women in the 1960s. During the 1978-79 revolution, funda-
mentalists skillfully manipulated popular stereotypes of women to move the
country in a fundamentalist direction.' In Iran, the phrase "westoxication"
was often referenced to express a widely held notion of the toxic influence of
western culture on modem Iranians, and women in particular.67 As the pro-
ponents of this argument stated, it was through the insidious nature of
"westoxication," which distorted people's identity and culture and degener-
ated the moral fabric of society, that foreign powers were able to exploit and
dominate Iran.68 The modem, westernized Iranian women became a visceral
personification of what was wrong in Iran, and became a focal point for
criticism and acts of defiance against the Shah's regime and the emergence
of an Islamic fundamentalist response to the problem.'
Khomeini's fundamentalist program was outlined in detail in his book,
Islamic Government. 70 However, to ensure a wide appeal to Iranians, his po-
litical campaign to take over a broad-based revolutionary movement tended
to co-opt the popular nationalist themes of opposition to the Shah's dictato-
rial rule, anti-corruption, anti-colonialism, justice and democracy.7 Though
63. The term "Shah" refers to the sovereign of Iran.
64. See, e.g., Tohidi, supra note 15, at 125; Ruhollah Khomeini, Address to a Group of
Women in Qum, in ISLAM AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND DECLARATIONS OF IMAM
KHOMEINI 264 (Hamid Algar, trans., 1981) ("The repressive regime of the Shah wanted to
transform our warrior women into pleasure-seekers.").
65. E.g., HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 74.
66. Tohidi, supra note 15, at 121-22.
67. Id. "Westoxication" is an English translation of the Farsi phrase "Gharbzadegi," the
title of a book by the leftist populist Iranian writer, Jalal Al-e Ahmad written in 1964. Id. at
121.
68. Id. at 122.
69. See Tohidi, supra note 15, at 124 ("The Westoxicated woman was culturally con-
structed as a negative image of the modern-minded woman. The stereotype was of a middle-
class unveiled and Westernized woman without productive contributions or reproductive re-
sponsibilities. If she worked at all, it was as a secretary in private or public offices of the ser-
vice sector, and her work was viewed mainly as decorative and dispensable .... She was pre-
occupied with her physical appearance and European fashions, would wear mini-skirts,
excessive make-up, mingle freely with men, smoke, drink, and laugh in public. She would
read romantic novels, if she read at all, and pick her role models from among Hollywood
stars, American soap operas, and pop singers. Her light-headedness and lack of interest in
politics and national issues had made her easy prey for commercialization and toxication by
the West ... ").
70. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT (Joint Publications Re-
search Service trans., 1979).
71. See generally HOYVEDA, supra note 13, at 71-91.
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many non-fundamentalist Iranians opposed the Shah and actively took part
in the mass revolt," the movement was nonetheless directly affected by the
mixed nationalist and religious messages orchestrated by Khomeini and his
followers. For example, Iranian fundamentalists gradually enforced the
adoption of the traditional veil (chador) upon women; both in order to dem-
onstrate their distaste for secular reforms as well as to make Iranians politi-
cally identify the veil as a nationalist symbol of opposition to the Shah."
Thereby, Iranian fundamentalists subtly created a basis of legitimacy for
fundamentalist rule.74
So effective was Khomeini at obscuring the fundamentalist agenda and
portraying himself as a saintly leader of a popular nationalist movement, that
many Iranians and western commentators who were not advocates of fun-
damentalism acknowledged his leadership and authority to implement a new
agenda for Iran with little questioning of his long-term aims.7 When the
Shah's regime had been toppled, and Khomeini took power in 1979, the new
Islamic government wasted little time implementing a fundamentalist
agenda. The measures that directly impacted the lives of all Iranians, espe-
cially women, included: mandatory dress codes, including the imposition of
the veil (hijaab); legal right of polygamy for men; a unilateral right of di-
vorce for men; gender segregation in many public settings; a ban on women
pursuing certain fields of higher education and employment; and the creation
of a religious police organization to monitor strict societal compliance with
the laws of the Islamic Republic." These changes demonstrated a critical dis-
tinction between the militant Islamic fundamentalist and the modernist. Ac-
cording to fundamentalists, a moral Islamic republic required strict controls
on its citizens, and women in particular.
2. The Impact of the Iranian Revolution
The Iranian Revolution inspired millions of Muslims around the world,
especially Shiites, and Khomeini's picture and posters could be found in al-
most every Muslim community.77 Khomeini was looked upon in some circles
as a hero for defeating a western-supported tyrant and for challenging U.S.
power. Iran's foreign policy was dramatically altered almost overnight, as
the new Islamic Republic sought to export its revolution abroad and take a
confrontational approach with Western interests.78 Arab governments reacted
72. Tohidi, supra note 15, at 123.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally HOVEYDA, supra note 13; MOIN, supra note 10; HIRo, supra note 16.
76. Tohidi, supra note 15, at 136-37.
77. HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 101-02.
78. Id. at 109.
2004]
15
Mahalingam: Women's Rights and the "War on Terror": Why the United States Sho
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
186 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
with alarm as fundamentalist movements, inspired by Iran, emerged and be-
came active in many countries. 9
Arab Sunni Muslims displayed two distinct reactions to the Islamic
revolution in Iran. Many saw Iran as a regional threat and allied themselves
with the United States and Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war
in the 1980s to strategically weaken and contain Iran while focusing on
crushing Iranian-inspired fundamentalist revolutionaries within the Arab
world.' On the other hand, many conservative Sunni Arabs in the Arabian
Peninsula (especially in Saudi Arabia) implicitly acknowledged the inspira-
tional effect of Khomeini's fundamentalist revolution and actively sought to
promote and export their own equally fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam,
based on the Wahhabi doctrine," to other Muslims.82 Though their agendas
were broadly similar, Sunni Arab Fundamentalists, in some cases with the
tacit acquiescence of pro-U.S. regimes, competed with Shiite Iranian Fun-
damentalists for influence throughout the Muslim world, giving aid to vari-
ous fundamentalist schools and groups." In addition, like Shiite fundamen-
talists, Sunni fundamentalists (most notably Osama Bin Laden) actively
sought to undermine Sunni regimes in the Arabian peninsula (e.g., Saudi
Arabia), which have long-standing ties with the United States.84
3. Taliban Rule in Afghanistan
Of the many examples of fundamentalism's march to power, the case of
Afghanistan is perhaps most striking. Like Iran, Afghanistan experienced
many decades of modernization under monarchical and communist rule prior
to the Soviet invasion in 1979.85 However, the country was weakened by
United States support of more conservative and fundamentalist mujeheddin
Afghan resistance groups and the bitter factional and regional infighting fol-
lowing the war.86 Accordingly, the Saudi and Pakistani backed Taliban
emerged to bring order to the majority of the country that it controlled.87 The
imposition by the Taliban of its Wahhabi inspired radical fundamentalist
agenda was swift and its enforcement severe, with women often facing the
79. Id.
80. Interview on PBS Frontline with Vali Nasser, Professor of Political Science, Univer-
sity of San Diego, (Oct. 25, 2001) available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/front-
line/shows/saudi/interviews/nasr.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
81. Wahhabism is an extreme brand of orthodox Islam. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Vail Nasser describes in detail the close connections between the growth of
Wahhabi inspired fundamentalist schools in Pakistan (madrasa), which spawned the Taliban,
and the Saudi network of religious charities that provide extensive funding as well as the ba-
sic curricula.
84. See HOVEYDA, supra note 13, at 146-47.
85. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 368-69
86. Id. at 369-70.
87. ld. at 372-74.
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harshest consequences."2 In some sense, what war and conflict failed to do in
terms of reversing Afghanistan's decades long trend of modernization, the
Taliban completed with shocking success.
Upon taking power in major cities like Kabul, Qandahar and Herat, the
Taliban swiftly imposed their interpretation of Shar'ia." They banned
women from working in most professions and government positions, forbade
women from attending school, mandated the burkha (a most oppressive form
of the veil), closed public schools and universities, and made several other
seemingly arbitrary and haphazard rulings, often proclaimed as mandates of
the Shar'ia, that underscored the totalitarian power of the Taliban regime to
control the lives of Afghans at their whim.' In addition to the complete loss
of personal freedom, education and economic opportunity, women in Af-
ghanistan suffered a sharp deterioration in health care and general well being
under Taliban rule.91
Even in Islamic countries where militant fundamentalists have not taken
power, parts of the fundamentalist agenda have been co-opted by govern-
ments as a way to strengthen their own legitimacy while limiting the power
and influence of fundamentalist movements. These actions, though possibly
keeping fundamentalists temporarily at bay, nonetheless acknowledge their
political strength, alter the political direction of internal reform and, in some
cases, the political orientation of the country vis-h-vis the West. In Bangla-
desh, for example, in a concession to a growing fundamentalist movement,
the original national constitution was amended to delete references to secu-
larism and to install Islam as the State religion.' Emboldened by this suc-
cess, Bengali fundamentalists have successfully restricted certain rights of
women, especially with regard to family laws.9" Similar challenges to the
rights of women have taken place in Pakistan, 4 Egypt, 5 and Nigeria, 6
88. Id. at 373-74; SKALNE, supra note 19, at 61; Afghanistan Report 2001, supra note 19.
89. See SKAINE, supra note 19, at 61.
90. Id. at 156-60 (providing samples of restrictions and decrees imposed by the Taliban,
including, by way of example, "[w]hipping of women in public for having non-covered an-
kles," and "[b]an on women's wearing brightly colored clothes").
91. Id. at 71-73. The Taliban regime was ousted by a U.S. led military coalition in No-
vember 2001 in response to the September 11' attacks. See The Global Reach of Al-Qaeda,
supra note 42, at 1. Al-Qaeda's principal leadership was based in Afghanistan and had a close
relationship with the Taliban regime. Id. at 1, 5. The U.S. supported caretaker government of
Hamid Karzai replaced the Taliban in 2002 following approval by a legislative council of rep-
resentatives from all parts of Afghanistan called a Loya Jirga. E.g., Pamela Constable, Karzai
Takes Afghan Helm With Nod to Ethnic Rivals, WASH. POST. June 20, 2002, at A14.
92. Salma Sobhan, Women in Bangladesh, in GENDER AND NATIONAL IDENTITY, supra
note 15, at 73.
93. Id. at 74.
94. Venkatraman, supra note 50, at 1993-98.
95. Roger Hardy, Egypt: Crisis of Identity, BBC NEws, Jul. 16, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/in-depth/world/2002/islamic_world/2131219.stm (last visited Aug.
27, 2003); Venkatraman, supra note 50, at 1987-1990; John 0. Voll, Fundamentalism in the
Sunni Arab World, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED 359-66, 377-90 (Martin E. Matty & R.
Scott Appleby eds., 1991) (describing the activities of the influential Egyptian fundamentalist
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among others, as a result of the growing power of fundamentalist move-
ments.
The growth of militant Islamic fundamentalism has not only resulted in
increased tensions between Islamic countries and the West, but has also pre-
sented a direct challenge to advocates of modernization within the Muslim
world. The most dramatic impact within Islamic societies has been on the
lives of women; as discussed above, the emergence of fundamentalist power
has coincided with substantial restrictions imposed on women in the name of
Islamic values. Accordingly, with modernizers embattled and fundamental-
ists strengthened, CEDAW can play an important role, injecting new life
into this debate, because the values embodied in the Treaty are diametrically
opposed to the ideology of militant Islamic fundamentalism and may be a
platform from which fundamentalists can be more effectively challenged.
III. CEDAW AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS
A. The Treaty
CEDAW has been widely recognized as the most comprehensive inter-
national statement on women's rights and has been called the "Charter of
Human Rights of Women." The Convention represents a culmination of ef-
group, the Muslim Brotherhood, during the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak regimes). In Egypt,
fundamentalists and modernizers have clashed on several issues pertaining to women's rights,
including the right of divorce, inheritance, and the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM).
With the assistance of international public pressure, including scrutiny from CEDAW's
Committee, progressive elements in Egypt have succeeded in pushing the Mubarak govern-
ment to advance new laws, such as the personal status law enacted in 2000 which provided
modest rights to women (which the Committee nonetheless criticized as deficient in key re-
spects), and a change in policy regarding FGM. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Egyp-
tian government had been noncommital on FGM, fearing a potential backlash from funda-
mentalist groups that supported the practice. However, in 1996, the Government reversed
course after Egypt's Health Minister issued a decree outlawing FGM. See Deborah Horan,
Egypt-Women: The Miserable Tradition Of Female Circumcision, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Sept. 28, 1997, available at http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/sep/circum.html (last visited Aug.
28, 2003); Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
U.N. GAOR, 24th and 25th Sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 38, at 36, 348, U.N. Doc A/56/38 (2001)
[hereinafter Egypt Report]. In 2003, the Mubarak Government signed an agreement with
UNICEF to end practices harmful to women and pledged to eradicate FGM by the end of
2003. Egypt Signs Plan To End Female Genital Mutilation This Year, UN WIRE, Aug. 5,
2003, available at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20030805/ 4497220.asp (last visited Aug.
28, 2003);.
96. See Nigeria: Woman Sentenced to Death Under Sharia, HRW WORLD REPORT 2001:
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/igerialO23.html
(last visited May 28, 2003) (woman sentenced to death after having pre-marital sex); Ayesha
Imam, Promoting Women's Rights in Muslim Laws, 2002, available at
http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoclhumphrey2002/acceptanceSpeechAyeshalmamEnglis
h.htm (last visited May 28, 2003) (noting that Nigerian states began passing fundamentalist
laws in 1999).
97. Aida Gonzalez Martinez, The U.N. and the Protection of Human Rights: Human
Rights of Women, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 157, 166 (2001).
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forts at the international level to develop an authoritative document encom-
passing the civil, cultural, political and social rights of women.98 CEDAW
was drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, largely by the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, and was opened for signature to the
U.N. member states following approval by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 18, 1979. As of December 2003, CEDAW had an impressive
175 ratifications, including 25 countries from the Muslim world, represent-
ing over ninety percent of the entire U.N. membership."°
As the title of CEDAW suggests, the Treaty's focus is "discrimination
against women," which is defined broadly to mean any "distinction, exclu-
sion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose
of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women.
. on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms.""1 1 CEDAW emphasizes two general principles which are re-
flected throughout its articles: (i) nondiscrimination and equal treatment of
women with respect to men; and (ii) mandating that States undertake re-
forms in both the public and private spheres to remove obstacles that ad-
versely affect women so as to ensure opportunity for women on a basis of
equality with men."
Article 2 applies the aforementioned principles to compel States to in-
corporate the Convention into national policy by mandating legal equality
for women and the elimination of all laws that constitute discrimination
against women. For example, Article 2(f) states that State Parties are "to take
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women."'0 3 Article 5 expands the State's role, requiring affirmative
measures to "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices.., and other
practices which are based" on traditional or cultural ideas of gender roles or
gender inferiority.' The Treaty's focus on equality and nondiscrimination
extends still further to education," employment,"° and health care. *1 7
98. Id. at 166-67. One of the main purposes of CEDAW was to consolidate and update
the many prior and disparate international pronouncements on women's rights into one au-
thoritative document. The precursors of CEDAW include the U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. Id. at 164-67.
99. CEDAW, supra note 8.
100. CEDA W Ratifications, supra note 9.
101. CEDAW, supra note 8, art. 1.
102. Id. annex.
103. Id. art. 2.
104. Id. art. 5.
105. Id. art. 10.
106. Id. art. 11.
107. Id. art. 12.
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Equally important, CEDAW does not limit itself to advocating general
principles, but attempts to incorporate into its provisions the reality of the
status of women obtained through decades of study, research and experi-
ence."'S Hence, CEDAW pays special attention to areas where women are
uniquely or disproportionately affected, such as the condition of women liv-
ing in rural areas and prostitution."° CEDAW further focuses on matters
such as marriage, maternity, reproductive rights and the family,"' where dis-
crimination on the basis of gender is not easily addressed by a reliance on a
principle of equal treatment due to acknowledged biological differences be-
tween men and women and the traditional social roles that have followed to
some extent from these distinctions."' CEDAW exhorts States to adopt af-
firmative action programs to help women reach a level playing field, and in
certain cases, such as maternity, women are to be given additional, special
rights."'
CEDAW does not simply require legal equality, but actual equality in
practice. It scrutinizes existing political, social and cultural practices by
States and societies that define and limit the scope of women's roles and
rights. Seen in this light, CEDAW's scope is potentially breathtaking, as it
directly challenges the legitimacy of arguments of sovereignty and cultural
relativism that many States have often relied upon to resist the demands of
human rights treaties. CEDAW assumes that, as a matter of law, all ratifying
countries to the Convention and its related predecessors have accepted their
principles by the legitimate exercise of sovereign free will and are, therefore,
obliged to implement these principles or be in violation of a legal obligation.
CEDAW is further empowered as a voice on women's rights by its Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the Committee).
The Committee is composed of twenty-three experts on women's issues
drawn from the State Parties and provides an analysis of State actions in re-
gards to treaty compliance."' The Committee also has a Permanent Working
Group that participates in an ongoing study and review of CEDAW's articles
to more precisely interpret and define how current practices in signatory
countries impinge upon the Treaty and the obligations of member States.
108. Id. annex.
109. Id. arts. 6, 14.
110. id. art. 16.
111. Other articles of the Convention that highlight specific areas of concern for women
include: student drop-out rates, id. art. 10(f); right to safe working conditions in regards to
safeguarding pregnancy, id. art. 11 (1)(f); prevention of employment discrimination based on
maternity, id. art. 1 1(2)(a); and, pregnancy health services, id. art. 12(2)(d).
112. Id. art. 11(2). Article 11(2) requires State Parties to take measures to require mater-
nity leave rights without loss of employment, provide social services to enable women to ful-
fill family and work obligations, and provide special protection for pregnant women with re-
spect to certain types of work that are demonstrated to be physically harmful. Id. art. 11(2).
113. CEDAW, supra note 8, art. 17. The Committee's mandate is to monitor progress
made by signatories in fulfilling treaty obligations. At biannual meetings, Committee mem-
bers review reports submitted by states the year after signing the treaty and every four years
thereafter. Id. art. 18.
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol34/iss2/2
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Countries are required to submit periodic reports on their compliance with
CEDAW and the Committee has the opportunity to critique and question the
State submitting the report."1 4 Although the Committee's scope was initially
limited to reviewing reports submitted by States, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Optional Protocol to CEDAW" in 1999 to enable individuals or
groups of individuals to submit complaints to the Committee for review and
comment."6 As of November 2003, there were 75 signatories to the Optional
Protocol, of which 52 had submitted instruments of ratification.
'
1
7
B. The Impact of CEDA W on Women's Rights
CEDAW has made a tangible contribution to the development of a nor-
mative and jurisprudential framework on women's rights that has served as
an interpretative guide for national lawmakers, judges and women's rights
advocates. In the years since CEDAW entered into force, the Treaty has
been cited as an important influence in national legal reform efforts in a
number of countries." 8 For example, Brazil relied upon CEDAW to reform
its national constitution and add specific rights for women relating to gender
based violence, marriage, family planning and employment parallel to those
elaborated in CEDAW. "' Additionally, Tanzania relied on CEDAW to de-
velop laws on inheritance rights,' and Botswana revamped its citizenship
rights laws in accordance with the Treaty. 2' Other countries that have ac-
knowledged CEDAW's influence in reform efforts include Japan, Colombia,
India, Zambia, and Uganda.' 2
Moreover, the Committee, through its reports and recommendations, has
assisted in developing specific norms that give tangible meaning to the prin-
ciples of nondiscrimination and equality outlined in the Treaty. One of the
114. Id. art. 18-21.
115. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, G.A. Res. A/54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4
(1999) [hereinafter Optional Protocol], available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/op.pdf (last visited May 28, 2003).
116. Id. art. 2.
117. Signatures to and Ratifications of the Optional Protocol, at http://www.un.
org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/sigop.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2004). The Optional Protocol en-
tered into force on December 22, 2000. Optional Protocol, supra note 115.
118. See Treaty Doc. 96-53: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and
Signed on Behalf of the United States of America on July 17, 1980: Hearing Before the
Comm. On Foreign Relations United States Senate, 107' Cong., 2 ad Sess. (2002), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107senatehearings&doid=f: 804
61.wais (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter CEDAW Hearing].
119. See BRINGING EQUALITY HOME, IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FoRMs OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 14-16 (Ilana Landsberg-
Lewis ed., 1998).
120. Id. at 21.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10, 13, 18, 23, 31.
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Committee's most significant contributions has been its identification of vio-
lence against women as a form of discrimination within the meaning of the
Treaty.' Violence against women does not appear anywhere in the Treaty's
provisions; nonetheless, in General Recommendation No. 19 (1 1' session,
1992), the Committee characterized gender-based violence as impairing or
nullifying women's enjoyment of human rights, which constitutes a breach
of the Convention "regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention
violence."'' 4 The report highlighted specific practices and sources of gender-
based violence, including female genital mutilation (FGM)'2 5 and family vio-
lence, "'26 and further held that CEDAW applied to both acts of States as well
as individuals and private actors.'27 Hence, any State that condones these
practices or fails to take measures to eradicate them, whether actually perpe-
trated by the State or private actors residing within the State, has failed to
satisfy its obligations under the Treaty.
Partly as a result of the Committee's work, many human rights advo-
cates favorably cite CEDAW as an effective tool, used by women around the
world, to combat violence and hold States accountable for the condition and
treatment of women within their jurisdictions.'28 At the Conunittee's behest,
many States have attempted to address the issue of violence against women
in their reports to the Committee, thereby opening themselves up to com-
ment and criticism.'29 The Committee's emergence as an interpretative body
has helped enhance its legitimacy as an authoritative voice on women's
rights. For many critics, however, the Committee's emergence in this regard
has been very controversial, as Treaty opponents have denounced Commit-
tee's rulings as arbitrary, overly intrusive, and subversive of national sover-
eignty and culture."3
C. Criticisms of CEDAW
States have made more reservations to CEDAW's provisions than most
other human rights treaties. Fifty-five countries have entered reservations to
123. General Recommendations Made by the Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 6 (11' Sess. 1992)
[hereinafter General Recommendations] available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ce
daw/recommendations.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
124. id.
125. See discussion supra note 95.
126. Id.
127. Id. 9.
128. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 89-92 (statement submitted by Amnesty Inter-
national).
129. See Egypt Report, supra note 95, at 35 (expressing the Committee's concern and
encouraging the Government of Egypt to withdraw its reservations to Articles 2, 9 and 16 of
the Convention).
130. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96
A.J.I.L 956, 973 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2002).
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the Treaty, representing nearly one-third of all State Parties.' More impor-
tantly, reservations have been made to key articles, including Article 2 (dis-
criminatory laws), Article 5 (discriminatory practices), Article 7 (right to
participate in the public sphere), and Article 16 (marital and family rela-
tions).' Equally significant, the United States, the world's most important
democracy and only superpower, has not ratified CEDAW, making it the
only major industrialized country not to do so."' The issue of reservations
and lack of U.S. ratification underscore two general criticisms of CEDAW
relating to its compatibility with state and cultural sovereignty, and the over-
all effectiveness of the Treaty in achieving its stated aims.
1. Preservation of State & Cultural Sovereignty
a. Critique of U.S. Conservatives
Many cultural conservatives in the U.S. have criticized Committee rec-
ommendations as overbroad, arbitrary, and reflecting a mindset that is seem-
ingly unconcerned with or unrestrained by the exigencies of state sover-
eignty, religion or local culture. 3 Some have criticized the Committee for
issuing recommendations that identify seemingly innocuous policies as po-
tentially violating the Treaty. For example, critics have pointed to the Com-
mittee's review of Belarus' report in 2000, where the Committee noted with
concern the extolling of Mother's Day and government policies that tended
to promote a traditional role for women as mothers as inhibiting the progress
of women to achieve equality with men in professional spheres.'35 Similarly,
U.S. conservatives have chided the Committee for some statements regard-
ing the decriminalization of prostitution, mandatory paid maternity leave,
131. Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW's Reservation
Regime Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process, 34 GEo. WASH.
INT'L L. REv. 605, 606 (2002).
132. Id. at 625.
133. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, supra
note 130, at 971-72.
134. See CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 137 (statement submitted by Patrick Fa-
gan, The Heritage Foundation) ("Despite the many good elements within CEDAW few
Americans are aware that CEDAW is also used by certain agencies within the United Nations
system in a campaign to undermine the foundations of society-the two-parent married fam-
ily, the religions that espouse the primary importance of marriage and traditional sexual mo-
rality, and the legal and social structures that protect these institutions. Using the pretext of
international treaties that promote women's rights, the social policy sector of the United Na-
tions-specifically, committees that oversee implementation of U.N. treaties in social policy
areas and assisted by special-interest groups-is urging countries to change their domestic
laws and national constitutions to adopt policies that will adversely affect women and chil-
dren.").
135. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
U.N. GAOR, 22nd and 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 37, 361, U.N. Doc A/55/38 (2000);
CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 126 (statement submitted by Tanya K. Skeen, Vice
President, Family Action Council International).
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and equal access to family planning services, including abortion, where the
practice is legally permitted. 36
The general thrust of the American conservative critique is that although
highlighting some important issues that affect women, such as prostitution
and violence against women, the Committee promotes a social agenda to re-
define gender roles in an incremental way which is subversive of "traditional
values," as that term is commonly understood by American social conserva-
tives. The Bush Administration echoed these concerns; first in a letter by
Secretary of State Colin Powell to Senator Joseph Biden of the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,'37 and later in the Administration's subsequent
decision in 2002 to back away from endorsing ratification of CEDAW pend-
ing further review."
In addition, Treaty skeptics argue that the Committee's authority to in-
terpret substantive provisions of CEDAW might have arbitrary, yet substan-
tial effects on domestic law that are unintended and uncontrollable by ratify-
ing States.'39 Underlying this criticism is the impact that ratified treaties have
upon a State that observes the rule of law. In the U.S., for example, ratified
treaties have supervening authority over any prior or future laws that run in
conflict with Treaty obligations."4 Article VI(2) of the U.S. Constitution ex-
pressly makes treaties the supreme law of the land."' This principle has been
affirmed in several U.S. Supreme Court cases, most notably Missouri v. Hol-
land, where the court affirmed that a treaty has priority and prohibitive effect
on the acts of States. "42
Another potential effect on domestic law is that ratified treaties may al-
low judges to look for additional sources of legal authority to interpret and
apply to specific cases. Judges may use findings from bodies like the Com-
mittee as persuasive authority to make a ruling and establish a chain of
precedent that will have a major impact on U.S. law in a manner that may
not have been contemplated or desired. There are numerous examples of
U.S. courts relying on evidence or rulings by international legal institutions
in deciding cases. One example is the growing body of U.S. law establishing
tort liability for corporations that are complicit in human rights violations
136. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 143-44 (letter to President George W. Bush
submitted by the Family Research Council).
137. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, supra
note 130, at 972-73.
138. Id. See also Howard LaFranchi, Women's Treaty Revives Old Debates, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MON., July 30, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com2002/0730/pOlsO2-
usgn.html (last visited June 5, 2003).
139. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, su-
pra note 130, at 973.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2.
141. Id.
142. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) ("Valid treaties of course are as
binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout the domin-
ion of the United States.").
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committed against foreign nationals. In some significant cases, U.S. Courts
have relied on the analysis of international tribunals, courts, and jurists to de-
fine the scope of human rights abuses that could entitle a plaintiff to reme-
dies. 43
b. The Islamist Critique: Cultural Relativism
The most significant reservations to CEDAW have come from Islamic
countries, which argue that CEDAW should not conflict with laws derived
from the Shar'ia. For example, Egypt, Bangladesh, Libya and Iran each
made reservations based on Article 2 (eliminating legal discrimination) and
Article 16 (marriage and the family), in effect granting supremacy to Shar'ia
based codes over CEDAW.'" These countries have taken a cultural relativist
approach in defending their reservations, arguing that CEDAW represents
the active imposition of western secular values or "cultural imperialism"
upon non-western countries.' Reservations, they argue, are therefore neces-
sary to develop a better balance between maintaining national sovereignty
and respecting the general objectives of the Treaty."
However, the reservations entered by Islamic countries are general in
nature and beg the question of whether Shar'ia does, in fact, conflict with
CEDAW to the extent cultural relativists claim. It is fairly clear that a mili-
143. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, *25-
*47 (2002). In this case, the surviving family of slain Nigerian human rights activist, Ken
Saro-Wiwa, filed suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum ("Shell") for tort violations committed
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) (18 U.S.C. § 1350). Id. at *6. The plaintiffs alleged
Shell's complicity with the Nigerian government in the murder of Saro Wiwa, in addition to
other human rights violations committed against the Ogoni people who resided in the oil-rich
Niger River delta region in Southern Nigeria. Id. In this ruling, the Second Circuit denied in
part Shell's motion to dismiss, and allowed the case to go forward to trial. Id. at *2. Judge
Kimba Wood expressly relied on an analysis of conventions and tribunals, and international
jurists to give meaning to the concept of violations of international law that would trigger the
remedies available under the ATCA, and cited a number of cases where U.S. courts have fol-
lowed a similar process of legal reasoning. See id. at 25-47. The Court's reasoning thus ex-
emplifies the important persuasive role that international legal statements can have on domes-
tic legal proceedings. The ATCA allows foreign nationals to file suit in the U.S. for tort
claims committed in violation of a U.S. treaty or international law. Id. at *8-*9. The statute
was rarely invoked until a landmark decision in 1980, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980), which affirmed the right of plaintiffs to seek damages against a corporate U.S.
defendant for torts committed abroad in violation of international law. Id. The Filartiga deci-
sion was later codified in Federal law by the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
144. Kimberly Younce Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights-
Toward a Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 659 (1994); Khaliq, supra note
50, at 4 n.15; Riddle, supra note 131, at 627.
145. See Schooley, supra note 144, at 658-59.
146. Bangladesh's reservation to the Convention reads as follows: "The Government of
the People's Republic of Bangladesh does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions
of Articles 2, 13(a) and 16.1(c) and 16(f) as they conflict with Shari'ah law as based on the
Holy Qur'an and Sunnah." Khaliq, supra note 50, at 4 n.15. Egypt's reservation to Article 2
reads as follows: "The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this
Article, provided it does not run counter to the Islamic Shari'ah." Id.
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tant Islamic fundamentalist interpretation of Shar'ia is in many respects in-
compatible with CEDAW.' Nor is there a way to reconcile the practices of
the Taliban with the tenets of CEDAW.'" However, as many observers have
pointed out, the clear evidence of diverse views regarding the meaning and
scope of Shar'ia suggests a more nuanced picture."9 For example, though
fundamentalists often support the hijaab as rooted in the Qur'an, mainstream
Islamic scholars argue that there is no support for such practices among the
primary sources of Islamic law. 5' Moreover, contrary to positions claimed
by militant Islamic fundamentalists, the primary sources of Islamic law do
not expressly or necessarily prohibit the right of women to receive an educa-
tion, to have access to health care, to work, to vote or even to have an abor-
tion.'"' In each of these examples, there is no direct conflict between
CEDAW and the Shar'ia.
The international community has responded by criticizing the arguments
put forth by Islamic countries and has insisted that the reservations be with-
drawn or sharply limited in scope.'52 Sustained international pressure over
time has resulted in many countries reexamining their reservations and du-
ties to affirmatively comply with the Treaty's provisions."' In the 1980s
many Islamic countries were largely dismissive of the Treaty; many refused
to join or issued broad, general reservations.'" By 2003, however, the num-
ber of ratifications by Islamic countries grew substantially and existing
Treaty members did not extend reservations to other key articles.'55 In some
notable cases, Islamic countries enacted controversial reforms (e.g., revi-
sions to family laws) to come into compliance with the Treaty's provisions,
while justifying such changes as consistent with Islamic law.'56 Given the
Muslim world's initial objections to CEDAW, this change in behavior, al-
though far from a full embracing of the Treaty, is nonetheless remarkable
given the fundamentalist wave that has swept the region since the Iranian
147. See discussion supra Part II(C).
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Khaliq, supra note 50, at 19-20.
151. Id. at 21-44. Some interpretations of Islam hold that a woman can obtain an abor-
tion up to the 119'h day of the fetus' development, or at any time where the life of the mother
is threatened. Id. at 43.
152. See General Recommendations, supra note 123, General Recommendation No. 4.
The Committee has made a point to urge each country that has made a reservation to reevalu-
ate its position, with the ultimate goal to have all significant reservations to the Treaty re-
moved. See generally Egypt Report, supra note 95.
153. Khan, supra note 50, at 334.
154. Id.
155. See CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 9. The number of ratifications by Islamic
countries has grown to 31 as of May, 2003, with the majority occurring since 1991. Of these
31 countries, 15 have entered reservations. See also Khan, supra note 50, at 334.
156. See Khan, supra note 50, at 334-35 (summarizing Tunisia's efforts to reform
women's rights to seek a divorce and obtain family planning (including abortion) services
along the lines of the Treaty).
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revolution in 1979. It is unlikely that such steps at accommodation would
have been taken without international pressure, as many of these countries
lack strong democratic institutions, which allow women and progressive
modernizers to express themselves effectively and build consensus through a
political process.
2. Effectiveness of Treaties
a. Political Realists
A third group of critics contend that CEDAW is largely ineffective at
achieving progress on women's rights.'57 Political realists, who comprise part
of this group, argue that treaties, without specific, enforceable obligations,
do very little to make meaningful strides in achieving stated goals in the con-
text of international relations.' They argue that since CEDAW has no effec-
tive enforcement mechanism, it is nothing more than a statement of aspira-
tion and can have no real impact on the status of women's rights.'59 They
claim reforms that have occurred over the years in areas such as the former
communist bloc of Eastern Europe have come from changes in political cli-
mates that are wholly unrelated to the workings of treaties."6 Further, they
assert that while the ends of CEDAW are laudable, the U.S. and its allies
would be better served to focus on changing the institutions or regimes
within specific countries in order to achieve these aims.''
This argument was summed up by Jeane Kirkpatrick who, testifying in
2002 before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding U.S.
ratification of CEDAW, expressed the following:
This convention unfortunately is unable to have much effect. Because I
lived at the U.N. for 5 years I became extremely impressed with the emp-
tiness of words. I would like very much to see women all over the world
have all of the rights that are enumerated in CEDAW.... I might say, too,
and I believe that it is important, it is more important to do than to
speak.... What really bothers me is the impression that people have that
they have solved the problem because they have passed their U.N. treaty.
The fact is, U.N. treaties read well and they act almost not at all. I mean,
they simply do not lead to improvement and progress almost never,...
unless and until there is implementation ... and that is true for all the trea-
ties, I might say, not just this treaty but all the treaties .... 162
157. See A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 53-60 (1999).
158. See id.; Lester Munson, CEDAW: It's Old, It Doesn't Work, and We Don't Need It,
10 HUM. RTS. BRiEF 23, 25 (2003).
159. Id.
160. See Weisburd, supra note 157, at 70-86.
161. See id. at 112; Munson, supra note 158, at 25.
162. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 29-30 (statement of Hon. Jeane Kirkpatrick,
Senior Fellow and Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Insti-
2004]
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b. Critics of CEDA W's Reservations Regime
A fourth group of critics argue that reservations to key provisions of
CEDAW, especially those entered by Islamic countries, undermine its very
purpose, as they preserve the discrimination between men and women pre-
sent in many Shar'ia influenced codes. 63 Further, the reservations regime of
CEDAW is too permissive, enabling States to enjoy the benefits of Treaty
membership without the burdens.'" These critics point out that most reserva-
tions to CEDAW have been accepted with only a few exceptions."
State Parties to CEDAW have essentially taken a universalist view of
treaty reservations, tolerating them in order to secure broad acceptance with-
out threatening state sovereignty. The merit of this approach is that it lowers
the political costs of participation while enabling States to establish a foot-
hold within the Treaty framework in order to benefit from its provisions.
Differences, it is argued, can be worked out among the members over time
in a manner that is politically feasible.'" However, as critics contend, this
approach to reservations is better suited to a commercial treaty or other con-
tractually structured treaties where there are direct advantages and benefits
to participation. 67 The cost of noncompliance in commercial treaties is easily
measurable in terms of reciprocal treatment from other States." Human
rights treaties, on the other hand, are created by States for the benefit of in-
dividuals, and there are no direct benefits to a complying State nor direct
disadvantages to non-compliance." Rather, human rights treaties attempt to
develop normative standards to which States are to adhere, enforce, and re-
frain from violating.7' Accordingly, many have argued that CEDAW should
move towards revising the reservations regime and placing limits on the
scope of reservations.'
In recognition of these criticisms, it should be noted that the Committee
has regularly demanded in its review of State practices that member states
reconsider previously entered reservations.' Nonetheless, to date the Com-
mittee has no effective procedural mechanism or authority to force States to
abandon or remove reservations other than by political pressure and moral
tute, Former Permanent Representative to the United Nations).
163. Riddle, supra note 131, at 626-27.
164. See id at 614.
165. Id. at 614-15.
166. See id. at 623-24.
167. See id. at 624.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 625.
171. Id. at 634-38.
172. General Recommendations, supra note 123, at General Recommendation No. 20.
For an example of the Committee's focus on scrutinizing reservations see Egypt Report, supra
note 95, at 35 9M 326-327.
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suasion." In this respect, CEDAW is less effective than other treaties which
restrict the free right to make reservations by subjecting such decisions to a
vote of the member States. For example, under the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (CERD)"' reservations may be rejected as
invalid by a two-thirds vote of the member States."5 This reservations re-
gime is credited with substantially limiting the number of reservations that
significantly modify obligations under CERD.176
D. Status of U.S. Ratification
As of April 2004, the United States had not ratified CEDAW, despite
the fact that President Carter signed CEDAW and submitted the Treaty to
the U.S. Senate for ratification in 1980 in accordance with Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.'77 The U.S. Senate did not make a definitive statement on
the matter until 1994, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rec-
ommended that the full Senate enact CEDAW subject to certain reserva-
tions, understandings and declarations.' The Clinton Administration for-
mally recommended ratification in 1998,179 but the matter languished in the
U.S. Senate, largely because of objections by American conservatives, until
July 2002, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee again recom-
mended ratification of CEDAW by the full Senate on a committee vote of
twelve to seven.'80
The Bush Administration, which at one time appeared open to support-
ing ratification, abruptly reversed course after sharp criticism of the Treaty
by American conservative groups in the summer of 2002.'' The Bush Ad-
ministration echoed many of the arguments of these cultural conservatives; it
raised questions about the judgment of the Committee with respect to the se-
lection of matters for review, and also raised concerns regarding the interpre-
tative power of the Committee and the impact its decisions might have on
U.S. and international law.'82 In short, the U.S. has not reached consensus on
173. Riddle, supra note 131, at 629-30.
174. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
175. Id. See also Riddle, supra note 131, at 635.
176. Riddle, supra note 131, at 635.
177. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 1. See also LaFranchi, supra note 138.
178. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 7 (opening remarks of Senator Barbara
Boxer). The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved CEDAW in 1994 by a
vote of 13 to 5. Id.
179. See Valerie A. Dormady, Status of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) in 1998, 33 INT'L LAW 637 (1999).
180. See National Organization for Women, Legislative Update, Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Approves CEDAW, available at http://www.now.org/issues/legislat/200208.
html#senate (last visited Aug. 28, 2003).
181. See LaFranchi, supra note 138 (noting that neo-conservatives and other members of
Bush's constituency oppose the Treaty).
182. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, supra
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whether CEDAW is compatible with U.S. law and values, or on whether it
can be an effective or worthwhile tool to promote women's rights around the
world.
IV. CEDAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR
A. The Role of Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy
United States foreign policy has, since the country's inception, con-
tained a values-based dimension, which is rooted in the American national
experience of British colonial rule, independence, democracy, territorial ex-
pansion, and its emergence as a global superpower. Throughout U.S. history,
the concepts of liberty, democracy, free markets, self-determination, human
rights and American exceptionalism have permeated the thinking and state-
ments of U.S. Presidents and policymakers from George Washington on-
wards. 3 Though the emergence and application of these concepts have in-
variably been interconnected with realpolitik concerns, the importance of
values-based arguments in U.S. foreign policy can scarcely be denied.'"
Moreover, when faced with ideologically based threats, U.S. foreign
policy has tended to emphasize values-based arguments to confront the chal-
lenge. For example, during the Cold War, successive American administra-
tions consistently emphasized individual liberty, democracy, human rights
and free markets as part of a message to confront and critique Communist
regimes that were autarkic and totalitarian. It was in the context of the
Cold War that the U.S. actively supported decolonization, European integra-
tion, free trade agreements, international institutions and the framework of
international human rights. 86 This emphasis on values during the Cold War
note 130, at 973.
183. See generally DAVID RYAN, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD HISTORY 1-18, 83-93,
116-62 (2000); CECIL V. CRABB JR., THE DOCTRINES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEIR
MEANING, ROLE AND FUTURE 371-437 (1982).
184. Even in a conflict such as the Spanish-American War, which many historians char-
acterize as a quest to promote U.S. power in the Western Hemisphere masked by the rhetoric
of the liberation of Cuba and the right of Cuban self-determination, the appeal to values based
arguments that went beyond power politics was important to justify the action and create a
political rationale for a post-war U.S. relationship in Cuba. See RYAN, supra note 184, at 58-
62.
185. RYAN, supra note 184, at 94-135.
186. Id. The following statement appears on the U.S. Department of State web site:
The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the estab-
lishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S.
foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States understands that
the existence of human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the
rule of law, combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent
humanitarian crises.
U.S. Department of State, Human Rights, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2004).
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underscored that the conflict was much more than a contest between global
powers for territory or resources; it was a battle for the allegiance of people
to adopt a particular form of government and a way of life.
Like communism, militant Islamic fundamentalism represents an ideo-
logical challenge to Western and U.S. values. Although there is no rival Is-
lamic state to challenge the U.S., like the Soviet Union or China during the
Cold War, militant Islamic fundamentalists nonetheless have long-term ob-
jectives to defeat Western power, weaken Western culture, and impose fun-
damentalist Islam upon the world.'87 In this context, human rights matter to
U.S. foreign policy because it clearly distinguishes Western values from
those of militant Islamic fundamentalism, and provides a rationale to chal-
lenge and critique this ideology within the Arab and Muslim world. The
value in confronting fundamentalism is further demonstrated by the U.S. fo-
cus on women's rights and political freedom in Afghanistan and other parts
of the Arab and Muslim world following the September 11, 2001 attacks. 8
B. The Connection Between Women's Rights and the "War on Terror"
The U.S. openly acknowledged that women's rights are connected in
part with the "War on Terror" with respect to the Taliban regime in Afghani-
stan. 9 The Bush Administration and its allies linked the Taliban regime's
support for Al Qaeda with the regime's draconian policies towards women
often referring to both in the same public statements."'g The U.S. and the
Western world, implicitly and explicitly recognized that both policies
stemmed from the same political philosophy that openly rejected the western
way of life.
However, it is important to emphasize that the Taliban regime was but
one manifestation of an ideology that has transcended particular groups or
leaders, and has built a global following over several decades. One should
187. See discussion supra Part II.
188. E.g., White House Press Release (Mar. 12, 2004) 2004 WL 61638206 (discussing
women and freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq).
189. See President Signs Afghan Women and Children Relief Act: Remarks by the
President at Signing Ceremony For Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001, Dec. 9,
2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011212-9.html (last
visited Aug. 27, 2003).
190. See id. ("America is beginning to realize that the dreams of the terrorists and the
Taliban were a waking nightmare for Afghan women and their children ........ In Afghani-
stan, America not only fights for our security, but we fight for values we hold dear. We
strongly reject the Taliban way. We strongly reject their brutality toward women and children.
They not only violate basic human rights, they are barbaric in their indefensible meting of jus-
tice.... You know, life in Afghanistan wasn't always this way. Before the Taliban came,
women played an incredibly important part of that society. Seventy percent of the nation's
teachers were women. Half of the government workers in Afghanistan were women, and forty
percent of the doctors in the capital of Kabul were women. The Taliban destroyed that pro-
gress. And in the process, they offered us a clear image of the world they and the terrorists
would like to impose on the rest of us.").
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not mistake the use of different tactics by fundamentalist organizations for a
diminishing or splintering of ideological focus, tenacity or intensity among
followers. Many fundamentalist groups have simply adapted to the political
realities of their respective situations, yet continue to adhere to and advance
the long-term objectives of imposing fundamentalism at home and confront-
ing the West abroad. For example, it is accurate to view Hezbollah, a fun-
damentalist organization that participates in a multi-party democracy in
Lebanon, as having the same long-term objectives as the Taliban, in spite of
striking differences in their approaches. 9' As Fereydoun Hoveyda writes,
Militant fundamentalists everywhere identify the West and its leader, the
United States, as the enemies of Islam and as the targets against whom the
ultimate jihad will be directed. But they know that no militant fundamen-
talist government is in a position to wage a successful "classical" war
against any European country, let alone the United States. They therefore
bide their time and prepare thoroughly for the "final" confrontation. In this,
respect, they must pursue three major objectives: seize power in Muslim
countries whose rulers are pro-Western and train and equip modem ar-
mies; stall the Middle East peace process and eventually destroy Israel,
which is the West's Trojan horse in the Muslim world; and finally,
weaken Western societies as much as possible and frighten their people
through terrorism and sabotage.'
The defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001 by a U.S. led
coalition did not end the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism. Rather,
history suggests that fundamentalists will adapt to the post September 11,
2001 climate and find new ways to survive and advance their agenda. This
conflict did not begin or end with the rise of A1-Qaeda or the Taliban re-
gime, and therefore a long-term strategy is required for the West to effec-
tively confront militant Islamic fundamentalism.
One of the key objectives of U.S. foreign policy, therefore, should be to
discredit militant Islamic fundamentalism as a viable political philosophy
within the regions where it is strongest, in the Arab and Muslim world, and
to strengthen and promote an alternative political philosophy that Muslims
can adapt to their own societies. This will necessarily require a debate on
values that extends to the streets of Arab and Muslim countries. One of the
most tangible and visceral issues that expose the stark difference in values
between the West and militant Islamic fundamentalists is the position and
role of women in society. As important as the emancipation of women is to
Western culture, the reverse is central to militant Islamic fundamentalists.
Therefore, if the U.S. is to effectively challenge militant Islamic funda-
mentalism as a viable political philosophy in the Arab and Muslim world, it
must confront the issue of women's rights. Secretary of State Colin Powell
underscored the importance of women's rights to U.S. foreign policy when
he stated, "the worldwide advancement of women's issues is not only in
191. HOvEYDA, supra note 13, at 63.
192. Id.
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keeping with the deeply held values of the American people, it is strongly in
our national interest as well." '93 Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
U.S. has placed a greater emphasis on the condition and rights of women in
the Muslim world, particularly in Afghanistan, and has explicitly advocated
political freedom, liberty, nondiscrimination, and equal opportunity for
women values that are largely consistent with the objectives of CEDAW and
the statement by Secretary Powell. In fact, the U.S. backed Afghan govern-
ment, led by Hamid Karzai, ratified CEDAW in 2003.'9 Militant Islamic
fundamentalists unabashedly reject these values as contrary to their agenda
and anti-Islamic.'9 However, the West should not reject the possibility of
constructive influence in the debate between fundamentalist and modernist
forces within the Islamic world, but should actively support those who do
not see the values of Islam and the West as irreconcilable and seek progres-
sive reform.
If militant Islamic fundamentalists are allowed to define the terms of
debate and control the agenda in Muslim countries regarding the interpreta-
tion of the Shar'ia, the role of women, and relations with the West, they will
continue to hold and gain power in and will be emboldened to advance their
anti-West agenda. In contrast, if fundamentalist ideas are actively chal-
lenged, alternative moderate forces can be empowered to discredit this ide-
ology among Arabs and Muslims and the global security threat that ema-
nates from it.
C. Why the U.S. Should Incorporate CEDAW into its Foreign Policy
From the perspective of the "War on Terror," CEDAW provides the
U.S. with many potential benefits. First, the Treaty's general principles are
largely consistent with official U.S. policy and law regarding women's
rights."6 Many observers, including the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, have determined that the U.S. would not have to add or change
any laws in order to achieve compliance with the Treaty." Furthermore,
193. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 33-34 (statement of Hon. Harold Hongju Koh,
Professor, Yale Law School, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights).
194. CEDAW Ratifications, supra note 5.
195. See discussion supra Part II(C).
196. CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 34 (statement of Hon. Harold Hongju Koh,
Professor, Yale Law School, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights).
197. See CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 3-4 (opening remarks of Senator Biden)
("For the United States, the treaty will impose a minimal burden. The U.S. Constitution and
existing Federal laws will satisfy the obligations of the treaty. The United States will need to
enter a handful of reservations to a treaty where it is inconsistent with our Constitution or cur-
rent Federal law, as we do with nearly every treaty, but the United States will not need to en-
act any new laws to be in compliance with this treaty."). Given that the Committee on Foreign
Relations approved the Treaty following the hearing, it can be assumed that the Senate either
accepted or did not challenge Senator Biden's view. See also CEDAW Hearing, supra note
62, at 99-109 (statement of the International Human Rights Law Group, Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights) (going further than Senator Biden by critiquing the proposed reservations,
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given that CEDAW is supported by a broad consensus of U.N. members,
U.S. ratification would represent a clear endorsement of the values shared by
the world community that the U.S. seeks to champion in the Arab and Mus-
lim world.
Second, contrary to the predictions of political realists, CEDAW has al-
ready made a positive impact in its first few decades. This is evident in the
large number of countries and human rights activists that have cited
CEDAW as both inspirational and instructive in legal reform movements.
Even among Muslim countries, the number of ratifications has increased and
international pressure has forced others to reconsider their approach to reser-
vations."" Internal movements for change often draw inspiration by the force
of example from international sources, and the volume of evidence from
countries that have enacted reforms relating to women's rights indicate that
the Treaty has made some progress in fulfilling this valuable role. A Treaty
with a measurable record of success is something that the U.S. could build
upon in achieving its oft-stated foreign policy goals with respect to the rights
of women worldwide, and in the Muslim world in particular.
Third, cultural critiques of CEDAW have been overstated. Cultural con-
servatives have relied on slippery slope arguments to underscore their belief
that CEDAW is subversive of traditional values." Absent from their argu-
ments is substantive evidence that the U.S. would be required to signifi-
cantly revamp its laws to comply with the Treaty, or that the U.S. legal sys-
tem or legislative process would have insufficient discretion to interpret or
implement laws that may conflict in part with sensitive Committee rulings.
Moreover, the bulk of the criticism from U.S. conservatives is largely aimed
at membership and rulings of the Committee, not the Treaty itself."° It stands
to reason that since even these critics implicitly concede (and in some cases
explicitly acknowledge) that the aims of the Treaty are generally worth-
while, the best way to address concerns about the operation of the Commit-
tee is to participate within the CEDAW framework and seek reform rather
than stand apart from it.
More importantly, although CEDAW is clearly at odds with militant Is-
lamic fundamentalism, it is not incompatible with more conventional inter-
pretations of the Shar'ia.20 CEDAW is even more compatible with progres-
sive Islamic movements that are less orthodox in their interpretation and
implementation of Islamic law and seek to achieve some balance between
understandings and declarations of the Bush Administration to CEDAW as legally unneces-
sary and politically undesirable).
198. See discussion supra Part III(C)(1)(b).
199. See CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 122-46 (petition and statements in opposi-
tion to ratification of CEDAW).
200. See, e.g., CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 123-25 (statement submitted by
Tanya K. Skeen, Vice President, Family Action Council International, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia) (specifically objecting to the views of the CEDAW Committee).
201. See discussion, supra Part III(C)(b).
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modernization and respect for local culture. With thoughtful political leader-
ship, CEDAW can be presented to Muslims in a way that does not funda-
mentally threaten mainstream notions of Islamic values-which themselves
are the subject of rigorous debate within the Islamic world-but rather ad-
dresses the excesses of militant Islamic fundamentalism. The cautious steps
by Muslim countries at compliance with CEDAW, as evidenced by modest
local reform efforts, a steadily increasing number of ratifications and the ab-
sence of additional or expanded reservations, underscore this possibility.
Seen in this light, CEDAW could be used as a tool to empower modern-
izers in the Islamic world to advocate and achieve progressive reform in a
manner consistent with local values and culture. Every act of reform in the
Arab and Muslim world, along the lines prescribed in CEDAW, correspond-
ingly weakens the impact of militant Islamic fundamentalism because the
principles of equality and nondiscrimination embodied in the Treaty are
diametrically opposed to the fundamentalist agenda. When women are suffi-
ciently empowered, their collective voice will further dilute the political
power of militant Islamic fundamentalists because women will be an impor-
tant constituency for leaders to court in order to secure political legitimacy.
Furthermore, U.S. advocacy of CEDAW in the Arab and Muslim world
on matters ranging from political freedom to preventing violence against
women can be useful in tilting the political balance of power away from fun-
damentalists. If the U.S. put its weight behind CEDAW, political leaders in
the Arab and Muslim world that desire peaceful and productive relations
with the West would be more inclined towards reform and marginalization
of the fundamentalists. This would represent an important change in the po-
litical dynamic that has existed in the Muslim world since the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, where fundamentalism
has steadily gained political support.' Critiquing the fundamentalist social
agenda from within is important, if not necessary, to effectively overcome
the global security threat that has emerged and grown in earnest since the
1970s.
Finally, the U.S. should incorporate CEDAW into its foreign policy be-
cause collective action is widely recognized by U.S. policymakers as indis-
pensable to an effective strategy against the threat posed by militant Islamic
fundamentalist groups,"3 which have a decentralized and international base
of operations. CEDAW can help the U.S. maintain its "anti-terror" coalition
around a common goal of protecting and promoting women's rights. One
recognized advantage of treaties-and why their use has been an enduring
feature of international relations over many years-is that they lower trans-
action costs for States to engage in collective action because such instru-
ments offer a transparency of purpose that lends greater legitimacy to the
202. See discussion, supra Part II(B).
203. See, e.g., Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, CRS Issue Brief for Con-
gress, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9040.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
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underlying effort."° States and their populations are less likely to suspect ul-
terior motives when aims are pursued through an open, collectively endorsed
framework.'05
However, the continued advocacy of women's rights in the Arab and
Muslim world is incongruous with the U.S. failure to ratify CEDAW. Many
advocates of ratification in the U.S. have made this argument, often with di-
rect reference to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.' ° In the absence of rati-
fication, the U.S. advocacy of women's rights remains an ad-hoc policy sub-
ject to the vicissitudes of political considerations and priorities. Furthermore,
the failure to acknowledge CEDAW's authority limits the ability of the U.S.
to persuade other countries to pursue reforms. As Senator Joseph Biden, an
advocate of ratification, stated:
For the United States, the [T]reaty can be a powerful tool to support
women around the world who fight for equal rights. Our voice on
women's rights will be enhanced by becoming a party to this treaty, be-
cause we will be empowered to call nations to account for their compli-
ance with the [T]reaty. Absent our membership, we cannot do that.
2
'n
Ratification would make CEDAW a permanent part of U.S. law and
would transform women's rights from the realm of politics to official gov-
ernment policy. This would not only bind future U.S. administrations, but
also condition the expectations of other States that deal with the U.S. States
would be forced to recognize that the issue of women's rights is non-
negotiable as a matter of U.S. law, and would have to factor this into the
cost/benefit analysis decision making. States may not be able to wholly dis-
regard women's rights if they know that doing so would run afoul of the
U.S.
D. Prescriptions for a U.S. Role in CEDAW
Strong U.S. participation could alleviate many of the acknowledged
weaknesses or shortcomings of CEDAW. Accordingly, the U.S. should seek
to take a leadership role to raise the profile of the Treaty and push for reform
in its operation and management. In order to incorporate the principles em-
bodied in CEDAW into the "War on Terror," the U.S. government should 1)
ratify CEDAW and incorporate a CEDAW review; 2) advocate reform of the
204. See Cary Coglianese, Globalization and the Design of International Institutions, in
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 297, 309-12 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue
eds., 2000) (noting that treaties remain a frequently used form of international cooperation
and that there are 34,000 treaties registered with the United Nations as of 2000).
205. See id.
206. See generally CEDAW Hearing, supra note 118, at 3-9 (opening remarks of Senator
Biden and Senator Barbara Boxer).
207. Id. at 4.
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Treaty and the Committee; and 3) highlight areas where women's rights is-
sues confront the fundamentalist agenda.
1. Ratify CEDA W & Incorporate a CEDA W Review
The first step the U.S. needs to take is to follow the recommendation of
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ratify CEDAW. The very
act of ratification would send a clear message that the U.S. is prepared to
unify its position with its allies, and that women's rights are a priority in
U.S. foreign policy. Following ratification, the U.S. government should take
the additional step of incorporating a CEDAW compliance review into the
annual U.S. State Department Human Rights report."' These two acts would
emphasize that the U.S. government places a high priority on women's
rights, shifting the issue from the realm of ad hoc politics to official govern-
ment policy, resulting in a consistent, permanent policy that restrains, condi-
tions and influences the actions of U.S. administrations and other States re-
gardless of political or ideological persuasion.
2. Advocate Reform of the Treaty and the Committee
Once within CEDAW's framework, the U.S. should use its political lev-
erage to push for reform to strengthen the Treaty. First, the reservations re-
gime should be reformed. Countries that have entered reservations, like
Egypt, Libya and Bangladesh, should be encouraged to remove them. Fur-
thermore, the Treaty should be amended to adopt a reservations regime
along the lines of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion, enabling countries to reject reservations made by another country with
a two-thirds vote. Limiting reservations strengthens the integrity of treaties
and reinforces the shared commitment to the basic principles.
Moreover, the U.S. should lend its voice to recommend reform of the
Committee's reporting process. A typical Committee report addresses a veri-
table laundry list of issues affecting women, with little indication of a prior-
ity ranking. While this approach has been effective in broadening the scope
of the Committee's competence to review State practices, it has created
some confusion and controversy regarding the Committee's principal objec-
tives and priorities with respect to advancing the Treaty's aims. Not all
women's rights issues are created equal, and the U.S. should make its voice
heard on what it thinks are priority issues. For example, future Committee
reports should focus less on the psychological impact of cultural and na-
tional holidays or public relations campaigns and emphasize matters such as
violence against women, education and health care in more detail. The U.S.
208. The U.S Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
issues a yearly Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, which can be accessed at
http://www.state.gov/g/dr/hr.
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could compellingly argue that ratification subjects it to the risks of the Com-
mittee's rulings and, therefore, it should have a say in recommending priori-
ties.
3. Highlight Areas Where Women's Rights Issues Confront the
Fundamentalist Agenda
Finally, one of the top priorities for the U.S. should be to focus on issues
where there is an intersection between women's rights and confronting the
fundamentalist agenda. The U.S. should not be shy about highlighting issues
like female circumcision, education, and access to health care in the Muslim
world. This approach would not only further U.S. interests but would also
strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Treaty. The U.S. would
benefit because it can shed the proper spotlight on the implications of a fun-
damentalist agenda for women's rights by highlighting practices advocated
by fundamentalists that violate the Treaty. This will spur a debate within the
Muslim world that places militant Islamic fundamentalism on the defensive,
strengthens reformers, and makes it harder for U.S. motives to be questioned
or misinterpreted. Even skeptics of the U.S. would be compelled to ac-
knowledge the significance of underlying issues like combating violence
against women. Additionally, the Treaty would be strengthened because ac-
tive U.S. involvement would lead to greater awareness of CEDAW and
would enhance incentives for compliance among all member states.
Moreover, international pressure and support for reform is vital to ef-
fecting meaningful change within countries. For example, international sup-
port for groups within Egypt that opposed female genital mutilation helped
push the Egyptian government to move against the fundamentalist position
on this issue.' ° Similarly, modernizers in the Arab and Muslim world are
likely to be strengthened, not deterred, by an international focus on other
women's rights issues. The U.S. should encourage women's rights groups,
both in the West and in the Arab and Muslim world, to file complaints be-
fore the Committee to initiate a broader debate on the role of women in the
Muslim world. By shedding light on such issues, the U.S. will confront an
important part of the fundamentalist agenda, which heretofore has not been
effectively challenged.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, one of the most important issues facing the U.S. and its allies is
the challenge posed by militant Islamic fundamentalism. Since the Islamic
revolution in Iran in 1979, militant Islamic fundamentalism has turned more
aggressively towards confronting and changing regimes within the Arab and
209. See Horan, supra note 95.
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Muslim world and directly targeting the center of western power, the United
States, in a bid to create a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.
The challenge posed by militant Islamic fundamentalism will endure,
unless the underlying ideology is directly confronted. This requires the
United States to actively engage in a debate with fundamentalists within the
countries in which this ideology has taken root. Military power, though cer-
tainly necessary to confront imminent security threats and at times to estab-
lish the conditions for reform, is less effective than discourse. Rather, as the
Cold War demonstrated, it is the power of ideas that matters most when try-
ing to win the hearts and minds of people over the long-term.
One of the critical fault lines between militant fundamentalist Islam and
the West is the issue of women's rights. Where the West advocates social
and political liberty for women, Islamic fundamentalists have systematically
sought to reverse such trends in accordance with their ideology. These strug-
gles have been on going in Muslim countries for several decades, with fun-
damentalists demonstrating notable successes beginning with the Islamic
revolution in Iran in 1979.10 By empowering women and modernizers within
the Islamic world, the U.S. can go a long way towards marginalizing militant
Islamic fundamentalism and consequently reducing the threat posed to
global peace and security.
An important step in advancing women's rights and integrating it with
the "War on Terror" is the U.S. ratification of CEDAW. CEDAW is ac-
knowledged as the authoritative statement on women's rights,211 and its prin-
ciples directly challenge the tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism.
Given the structure of CEDAW, the interpretative role of the Committee,
and its large number of signatories, which include many Muslim nations,
CEDAW represents a potentially useful vehicle to force States to engage in a
debate on women's rights, and empower Arab and Muslim modernizers who
link the cause of women's rights with progress and prosperity.
In the context of the "War on Terror," the U.S. could lend important po-
litical leadership within CEDAW to focus the Committee's priorities on
those issues that are of the highest priority including political freedom, vio-
lence against women, education, and health care. This would build a consen-
sus with which to confront militant Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore,
by integrating the cause of women's rights into the "War on Terror," the
U.S. would present a tangible vision of the society and values it envisions
for the Muslim world. The force of example and political leadership would
inspire and resuscitate a much needed debate on the role of women in Is-
lamic societies, and could be vitally important to contain and defeat the
threat posed by militant Islamic fundamentalism.
210. See discussion supra Part II(B).
211. E.g., Venkatraman, supra note 50, at 1950, 1953.
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